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Non-voting shares in France: 
An empirical analysis of the voting premi urn 
November 1998 
Abstract: It is the  o~jective of  this paper to determine the  voting premium for /<"'rench  shares 
by comparing the  values of voting and non-voting shares,  and to  analyze the  value of the 
voting rights.  The  study IIses data for 25 French companies which had both types of  shares 
outstanding and traded on the stock exchange during the entire  periodfrom 1986 to  1996,  or 
for some time during this interval.  The average value of  the voting premium is 51,35%. 
The paper analyzes the reasonsfor this surprisingly high value by testing d(fferent hypotheses 
based 0/1 dividend differences,  the  revival)  of the  voting right,  capitalization,  shareholder 
structure,  alld the share of  nUll-voting capital in total equity capital.  The  regressions show 
that the shareholder structure strongly influences the value ojthe voting premium. 
A case study of  the attempted takeover of  Casino by Promodes shows that investors attach a 
much higher value to  the  voting right during relevant situations than at  other tomes.  Both 
companies invulved had,  at the time,  two types uf  shares outstanding and listed.  Furthermore 
the paper ShOH!S  thaI non-voting shares have never played an important role ;'1 equity jinance 
in France since the companies have different alternatives. 
111 an international cumparison,  France is found to have the second highest voting premium, 
exceeded only by that of  Italy.  A probable reason is the low quality of  the national accounting 
standard\' and the low level of  minority shareholder protection. 
Resume: Le but de ce cahier de recherche est I 'evaluation du droit de vote  en France par une 
comparaison des actiuns avec et sans  droit de  vote.  L 'analyse est basee sur 25 societes ayan! 
introduit ces deux types d'actiolls en  bourse pendant line partie ou fa  totalite des  anllees 
1986-1996,  NOlls  determinons pOllr  cet/e  ec:halltillol1  I'existellce  d'une  prime  moyeflJ1e  de 
51,35%  sur  les  actions  sails  droit  de  vote.  A  travers  Ie  test  de  differentes  hypotheses 
(difference de dividende,  reprise du droit de  vote,  capitalisation,  actiol1narial et pourcentage 
du capital sans droil de vote),  1101IS essayons ensuite d'expliquer l'importallce de c:ette prime. 
Les regressiuns indiquellt qlle la structure de  I 'actionnariat influence jortement la prime.  Le 
cas pratique de  I 'OPA  Promodes slfr Casino -ces deux societes ayant introduit deux classes 
d 'actions en bourse- mOl1tre que les il1vestisseurs donnenl une valeur plus importante au droit 
de vote pendant des situatiolls critiques. L 'histoire du jinancement des entreprises montre que 
Ius actions sans droit de  vote n 'ont jamais joue un role important parce qu 'if existe d'aulres 
alternatives moins cheres.  Au niveau international,  la France presente la  2eme prime fa plus 
elevee apres tItalie. L'explicatioll du  niveau de  ces differents primes est a chercher dans Ies 
f10rmes comptables et dans la protection des actionnaires minoritaires. 
JEL classification: G 12, G 32, G 34 
Key words: dual-class shares, ownership structure, voting premium, corporate governance -2-
1  Theory of the Firm and non-voting shares 
Economic  theory  predicts  that  in  a  world  without  costs,  with  symmetrically  distributed 
information,  an  unambiguous  allocation  of strong  ownership  rights  and  with  a  system  of 
complete  and  perfect  markets,  decentralized  or market-based  decision  making  leads to  an 
optimal allocation of resources. If these conditions are not fulfilled,  organizations can  have an 
advantage over markets provided that they create suitable structures to allocate  resources.  In 
this  context  it  is  important  that,  according  to  Jensen/Meckling  (1976),  a  firm  can  be 
characterized as a network of contracts between different interest groups such as  shareholders, 
creditors, employees, clients and suppliers. 
Rights  and  obligations  of the  members of the  different  interest  groups cannot  be  specified 
completely  in ad vance for all possible future circumstances. A complete set of  contracts would 
be much too expensive due to "bounded rationality"  of the parties (Williamson  1985) and  to 
asymmetrically distributed information. The high costs of complete contracts would lower the 
value of a company.  On the other hand,  incomplete contracts can lead to  moral  hazard and 
hold-up problems as  every party would try to exploit this  situation  which  is  also not in  the 
interest of the organization and the parties to the network of contracts. For instance,  lacking 
appropriate incentives  and  monitoring,  managers tend  to  minimize their work effort.  As  the 
incompleteness of  contracts should not lead to a failure of  the organization, there is thus a need 
for controlling and monitoring the management. 
GrossmanlHart  (1986)  and  Hart  (1995)  develop  an  "incomplete  contracting  approach"  to 
explain the efficient boundaries of  a firm.  They define a firm  as a set of non-human assets under 
common control, and the owners of an asset as  those who have the residual control rights.  In 
the case of a corporation, the owners are the shareholders with voting rights, and they can,  at 
least in principle, exercise control over the management by using their voting rights. 
In  most cases,  corporations  follow the one share - one  vote-principle.  Where  this  principle 
does not apply,  there is  no  direct correspondence between residual income rights and  residual 
control  rights,  and this  may  impair the functioning  of the control  over those  who  run  the 
business of the  corporation.  A shareholder who has  all  voting  rights,  but  only  holds  a small 
fraction of the shares may have,  and pursue, interests beside the maximization of the  value of 
the corporation's equity,  since he  does not bear the  full  consequences of his  decisions.  This 
suggests  that  corporations  with  non-voting  shares  are  inefficient  due to  their  shareholder 
structure, 
1 and this inefficiency might even result in a delisting.
2 
I  Grossman/Hart (1988) and Harris/Raviv (1988,  1989) extensively analyze the separation of cash flow rights 
and voting rights and thc optimality of a one share - one votc system. -3-
There are three main motives for introducing non-voting shares. 
One is that the introduction of non-voting shares can protect a dominating position even if this 
is  only for the psychic benefit of being in  control. Non-voting shares  are a  takeover defense 
(Dumontier 1988) for the present shareholders. It makes it  easier for them to form  a coalition 
which  controls the corporation and  to limit  the  influence  of those shareholders  who  do  not 
belong to this coalition. At an empirical level, this suggests that deviations from the principle of 
one share - one vote are more likely to be found in  corporations with concentrated ownership 
and in those with a strong influence of a family than in widely held corporations. 
A second motive for having non-voting shares is that it can help to facilitate the monitoring of 
the management. As monitoring is costly, only major shareholders have an incentive to monitor 
the performance of the management (Shleifer/Vishny  1986).  If those who  have  an economic 
incentive to exercise their control rights used them in  such a way that this is  also  of  benefit to 
other shareholders, for instance by  preventing managers from shirking,  a concentration of the 
control rights in their hands would increase the overall value of  the company. 
Thirdly, many countries, especially Scandinavian countries, have for a long time had a policy of 
protectionism; they try to limit  the  influence  of foreign  shareholders  in  national  companies. 
Permitting  only  non-voting  shares  for  foreigners  is  a  means  to  achieve  this  aim. 
BergstrbmlRydvist (1990) provide this as  an explanation for the fact  that in  1986  74% of the 
publicly traded Swedish companies had issued non-voting shares. 
These three motives indicate why it  may constitute an  advantage for  those  shareholders with 
voting rights that others do  not have voting rights. But what does this imply for  the potential 
shareholders without voting rights? If his  voting rights can only have  a small  influence,  the 
typical small investor will be indifferent between voting or non-voting shares.  If the non-voting 
shares are sold with a discount and are paid a higher dividend, he will  even  prefer this  type of 
shares in particular if the probability of participating in a new coalition to control the company 
is low. Therefore, in reality, issues of non-voting shares are typically targeted at investors with 
no intention  of controlling the corporation.  In  Scandinavian countries non-voting shares are 
often the only possibility to invest in these countries.
3 
So far,  I  have  analyzed  the  motivation  of companies  to  issue  non-voting  shares  and  the 
motivation of investors to buy them. Taken together, these arguments do not provide a reason 
~ This does not seem to be the case since, for example, there are still rpos of cOlllpanies with non-voting shares 
in  Germany,  and  in  many  other  countries  non-voting  shares  are  still  important.  For empirical  eyidence 
concerning the role of dual-class shares in various countries, see Rydqvist (1992). -4-
why non-voting shares  should trade at  a discount which  may  even be sizable as this  paper 
reports for the case of France (see Appendix 1).  Thus the question remains why investors will 
attribute a positive value to the voting right or,  looked at from the other side, attach a  lower 
value to non-voting shares.  One possible answer to this question,  which has  been  introduced 
into the recent theoretical and empirical literature by Kristian Rydqvist  (1986) is  that control 
rights are valuable since the voting shareholders can make decisions which are favorable only 
for themselves. As Zingales (1998)  takes up this argument: 
"The only possihle answer is that,  although all shares are  created equal, some - like the pigs 
in George Onvell's Animal Farm - are created more equal than others", 
Furthermore Zingales (1994,  1995)  argues that the value of the  right  to vote, the so-called 
voting premium,  is  positively  correlated with  private  benefits  which  only  an  investor with 
voting rights can appropriate for himself in  addition to dividends and capital gains,  and  which 
are likely to be at the expense of others who do  not have voting rights.  These private benefits 
may arise from high wages, payments in kind,  and exploiting other business relationships with 
companies  under  control  of the  same  shareholder  (Shleifer/vishy  1997),  Based  upon  the 
models  of Grossman/Hart  (1988)  and  Harris/Raviv  (1988),  BergstrornlRydqvist  (1992)  for 
Sweden and Zingales (1994) for the USA show that the voting right is  particularly valuable in 
case of a current or imminent  battle over control. The value of the voting  right  depends on 
two factors,  one being  the possibility that a vote is  pivotal in  a control contest and the other 
one being the extent of possible private benefits for those who gain control of  the  corporation. 
These factors are anticipated and reflected in the price of  voting shares. 
Different corporate governance-systems, and, more generally, different legal  systems, may lead 
to  different  possibilities  of appropriating  private  benefits;  and  these  differences  should  be 
reflected in  the average market value of  voting rights.  In what is,  according to my  knowledge, 
the first  comprehensive stud/  of dual-class shares in  France, the present paper analyses these 
propositions concerning the value of voting rights and its determinants. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 presents the major characteristics of  voting and non-
voting shares according to French law.  Section 3 presents the data sources and the calculation 
methods used in  the empirical analysis and  the basic result concerning the overall  level  of the 
value of the voting premium  in  France.  Section 4 introduces possible  factors influencing the 
size of the voting premium,  whose impact  is  evaluated empirically by  means of a  regression 
3 Eunl  Janakiramanan (1986) describe ownership restrictions in  16 countries, for Finland see Hietala (1989) and 
for Nomay see 0degaard ( 1998). 
4 An earlier analysis (l-lussonJJaquillaUSchintowski  1987) was limited to a short period (1985-1986) and to only 
one of three non-\'oting share types (certiftcat d'investissement). -5-
analysis in  the following  section 5.  Section 6 supplements these results by discussing the case 
of a takeover contest involving two companies which  both had voting and non-voting shares 
outstanding at the time of  the contest. Section 7 continues with an  analysis of the significance 
for  non-voting  equity  in  France  and  places  the  French  empirical  results  in  an  international 
context. Section 8 discusses the implications of  the findings and concludes. 
2  The institutional situation in France 
2.1  Characteristics of voting shares 
The only time of the year a shareholder can  make direct  use  of his  voting right is  the annual 
general meeting where all  requests have to be approved by more than 50% of the  votes.  This 
includes  the  dividend  distribution,  the  elections  for  the  supervisory  board  (conseil 
d'administration  and  conseil  de  surveillance)  etc.  All  changes  of the  statutes  need  a  2/3 
approval  of the shareholder meeting which  includes  in  particular  the issuance of new  equity 
capital, the issuance of non-voting shares and  the  granting of double votes to shares.  French 
law  provides  the  possibility  to  grant  two  votes  only  for  so-called  registered  shares,  whose 
transfer  is  restricted  in  certain  respects,  and  only  if these  shares  have  been  held  for  two 
consecutive years (for publicly traded companies even only after four years). In contrast to this 
it is not allowed to issue ordinary shares with more than one vote.  Company by-laws can limit 
the voting power of  the shareholders. 
2.2  Characteristics of  non-voting shares 
There are three different types of non-voting shares. They have in common that the  percentage 
of non-voting capital must not exceed 25% of  total equity and that the par value of voting and 
non-voting shares must be identical: 
1.  aclio/1 cl dil'idellde priorilaire salis droit de vole  (ADP) 
2.  cerlijical d  'illveslissell1el1fcer/~ficat pelrolier (ClICP) 
3.  certificat d 'illvestissemelll priviligie (CIP) 
The first type, a share with preferred dividends and without voting right  (ADP), was first  used 
in  1983. This type of  shares is created either by exchanging voting into non-voting shares or by 
increasing equity  capital.  It  is  only  allowed  to introduce  ADP when  profits  have  been  made 
during  the  last  two  years..  The  dividend  is  split  into  two  parts:  a first  dividend  (premier 
dividende) and  a super dividend  (super dividende).  ADP  holders  receive  at  least a  7,5% first 
dividend  of the par value  while  the  ordinary  shareholders  receive  only  a minimum  5% first 
dividend.  The super dividend  is the same for  both shareholders. If the dividend is  not granted, 
the claim to it  will  be accumulated and  the voting right  has  a "revival
ll  after three consecutive -6-
years of not fully  paid  dividends  and  remains  in  force until  the  accumulated  claim  to past 
dividends has been paid off. 
The second type of non-voting shares,  investment certificates Cl and  CP,  had  initially been 
created to facilitate the increase of equity-capital of state-owned corporations without loosing 
control.  But legally,  the CIs can be issued by  all  corporations.  CIs  have been allowed since 
1983, whereas CPs have been issued  since  1957 only by  the oil-companies Elf-Aquitaine and 
Total.  The dividend for both types of non-voting shares is  identical to ordinary  shares, but  in 
comparison to ADP shares the voting right can never revive.  They can only be  issued in  the 
course of  an increase of capital. 
Shares  of the  third  group,  CIP,  receive  higher  dividends  than  the  corresponding  ordinary 
shares, but as in  the case of Cl and CP, the voting right cannot revive. This type of share has 
so far only been used by state-owned firms. 
It is  a  peculiarity of the French law  that there  are separate certificates for the  voting rights 
(certificat de droit de  vote.  CDV). By law,  these certificates, which have to be registered, are 
distributed among the present ordinary shareholders at the time of  a CI issue in  proportion of 
their existing  voting  rights  based  on  the  holding  of ordinary  shares.  The  number of CDVs 
corresponds to the number of CIs.  By possessing a Cl as  well as a CD  V,  an ordinary share  is 
automatically created. Between 1983  and  1988, it was forbidden to  sell CDVs.  The only way 
of  de facto selling the voting right was to buy a CI and to sell the re-established ordinary share. 
Since 1988 the French legislature has allowed trading of  CD  V on the stock exchange to insure 
the liquidity of  the certificates, as well as to have a better control of  the transactions. However, 
as only holders of  CIs have the right to acquire CDVs - which then automatically leads to their 
convergence - their liquidity remains very limited. In addition,  every CDV  can  only be traded 
once. 
3  Data 
Evidently and almost by definition, it is difficult to assign a value to private benefits. Control of 
a  company  is  also  not  valued  in  traditional  finance  theory  which  only  takes  into  account 
discounted expected future  cash flows.  If the private benefits  of control  could  be  quantified 
directly, they were no longer private and minority shareholders could initiate legal proceedings 
against  the  corporation  or  the  controlling  shareholders  who  appropriated  benefits  for 
themselves. It follows that these control benefits can only be measured indirectly.  In principle, 
there are two possible ways  to  value control:  The  first  one would  consist in  measuring  the 
difference between the price per share if a control  block  changes hands,  and the share price -7-
before  the  offer  (e.g.  BarclaylHolderness  1989).  The  second  option  IS  to  calculate  the 
difference between voting and  non-voting  shares.  Like  Rydqvist  (1986)  and  Zingales  (1994, 
1995), this paper follows the second way, which is the only possibility to measure the value of 
control in the absence of information concerning the prices of block transactions.  For France, 
like  many  other  countries,  this  information  is  not  accessible.  I  calculated  the  voting  right 
premium (VRP) as the relative price difference of the voting  shares over the non-voting shares 
as a percentage of  the latter: 
I7?P 
vs 
XI'S' 
VS' _NVSi 
JO'  ~I  t 
Vlv ,  =  NVS 
t 
voting righl prcmium of stock i at time t 
voting share quotc of slock i at time t 
nOll-voting share quote of stock i at lime t 
(1) 
The sample consists of  25  companies whose voting and non-voting shares were publicly traded 
on the stock exchange (marche it reglement mensuel, marche au comptant and second marche) 
during the entire period from  1986 to  1996 or for any time during this  period (see  Appendix 
1  ). 
For the determination of average VRPs,  I calculated the daily ratio  VRP only for those days on 
which both types of shares of the company i were traded. The quotes were  provided by  SBP-
Bourse  de  Paris,  Datastream  and  Fininfo.  All  other  information  was  taken  from  the  annual 
reports, press articles, and the database Dafsaliens. For the calculation of  VRPs,  I neglected the 
additional  dividend  rights  for  ADP  and  CIP-shares  since  the  additional  net  payments 
represented  on  average  only  1  %  of the  ADP-market  price,  and  consequently  have  little 
economic value.  The effect  is  an  underestimation  of the voting  right  premium  which  should, 
however, be only of  minor importance. 
Traditional asset valuation theory only takes into account expected dividends.  The voting right 
is  not given  an  explicit  value.  Following this theory,  the share premium  VRP  should  be non-
positive,  as  all  permissible forms  of non-voting shares require that the  dividends paid on non-
voting  shares  may  not  be  below  those  on  ordinary  shares.  In  contrast to  this,  Appendix  5 
shows a positive premium for almost all  sample companies although the  results vary during the 
sample period and  across all  companies.  The average  VRP - over companies  and  over  time -
amounts to  an  astounding 51,35% with  a maximum of 137% for  Pechelbronn in  1990  and  a 
minimum of -9% for Pechiney in  1995. -8-
4  Factors of  influence on the voting premium 
Based upon the assumption of the presence of private benefits,  I assume that the voting right 
has a positive value. The fact  that in  France  the market for takeovers is  almost  nonexistent 
(Franks/Mayer 1990) and thus cannot be the only  explanation for a voting right  premium,  as 
was argued  in  section  1,  I  accept the assumption  that there are probably  opportunities  to 
appropriate private benefits.  Based on this  working  hypothesis,  this  section looks at  factors 
which might determine the voting premium or,  in  other words, the price difference between 
voting and non-voting shares. 
The first factor is the dividend difference. The value of a share results from  two  factors: cash 
flow rights and voting rights. The standard discounted cash flow model only takes into account 
the cash flows.  Since  ordinary  shares  and  CIs  receive the same  dividends,  they should  be 
equally priced if cash flows were the only determinant of value  and price.  In contrast to this, 
ADP and  CIP receive  a  higher dividend  and according to the  conventional theory of share 
valuation, they should even be more valuable than ordinary shares as  long as voting rights are 
neglected (HermannIBlignieres 1983). 
The  difference  between  the  dividends  for  non-voting  shares  (NVSDiv)  and  voting  shares 
(VSDiv) can be calculated in absolute and in relative terms.  Since quotes were not available for 
a long enough period for CIP, the following calculations only cover the ADP  shares. 
The absolute difference ADifj  of  the dividends paid in year t is defined as 
ADifj/ ==  NVSDiv;  - VSDiv;  (2) 
and the relative dividend difference IWifj  as 
NVSDiv
i 
- VSDiv' 
RDiJf/  ==  V.s~iVi  t 
t 
(3) 
According to traditional finance theory, the superior dividend should lead to a higher value for 
ADP-shares, with the dividend difference determining the difference in  value. However, as  we 
have  seen,  there  is  a  positive  voting  premium  in  France.  In  combination,  these  two 
considerations lead directly to Hypotheses 1: 
Hypothesis 1:  The value of the dividend  difference influences the share price difference. The 
higher the dividend advantage of  the ADP over ordinary shares, the lower the voting premium. -9-
As  already  mentioned  in  section  2,  the  voting  right  of ADP-shares  "revives"  if for  three 
consecutive years the accumulated difference between the "first dividends" paid on ADP-shares 
and the statutory first  dividend has been positive. The failure of a corporation to pay the  full 
statutory "first dividend" increases the probability that the voting right "revives".  As  the price 
difference seems to be connected with the lacking voting right, we can formulate Hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis  2:  The likelihood  of a  revival  of the  voting right  has  an  effect  on the voting 
premium. The higher it is, the lower the voting premium. 
Synergies can be realized by takeovers of companies.  An  important  condition  for  successful 
takeovers is the prospect for financing the deal. High capitalization of  the  shares result in  high 
prices to be paid in a takeover and therefore limit the number of potential buyers. This results 
in Hypothesis 3: 
Hypothesis  3:  The  capitalization  of the  ordinary  shares  influences  the  voting  premium.  A 
lower capitalization results in a higher voting premium. 
One can calculate the capitalization (Cap)  by multiplying the number of outstanding ordinary 
shares (Num V/)j  with the quotation p of  the last trading day t in each year: 
Cap:  = Num VS; *  P:  (4) 
The ratio of  voting to non-voting shares varies from corporation to corporation as well as over 
time in the case of a given corporation. A shareholder needs more than 50% of the  shares to 
have a  majority and  to control  a  corporation  with  no  non-voting  shares.  If the corporation 
issues  the  maximum  amount  of 25%  of non-voting  shares,  the  shareholder  can  limit  his 
investment to 37,5% of  the ordinary shares to have the majority of votes, which would make it 
easier for him to gain control. In order to test the influence of the ratio of voting to non-voting 
shares on the price difference, the variable RelSha is used. It is defined as the fraction of  voting 
shares (Nul11 V/»)  to the total number of  shares issued (Num TS). 
1  i  NumVS; 
Re IShal  =  l\T  r:S'i 
lVuml'l 
(5) 
with RelSha f, [0,75; 1] -10-
In the case of a  high  ratio RelSha the ordinary shares and therefore the voting rights can  be 
assumed to be relatively less valuable since an  investor needs to hold  more  ordinary shares to 
control the majority of  votes. This leads to Hypothesis 4: 
Hypothesis 4:  The relationship of ordinary to  total  shares influences the  value  of the voting 
right. The lower the fraction of  voting shares, the more valuable the voting right. 
The shareholder structure is  frequently referred to  as  a reason  for  the existence of a  voting 
premium (e.g.  Rydqvist  1986,  Husson/Jacquillat/Schintowski  1987, KruselBerglWeber 1993, 
RothaugelMenkhofflKrahnen  1994).  The underlying  argument is that influential  shareholders 
have more extensive opportunities than small  shareholders of influencing  the management  of 
the corporation  in  such  a  way  that  they  can  get  private  benefits.  One  reason  for  this,  but 
probably not the only one, is that large shareholders are represented at the annual shareholders' 
meeting  and  can  have  their  candidates  elected  more  easily  than  small  shareholders.  For 
influential shareholders the voting rights are more valuable, and  this  should result in  a higher 
voting premium in  corporations with concentrated shareholdings. This applies in particular to 
corporations with a strong influence of a family.  Besides having a large fraction  of the voting 
rights, these families often also have important management functions. 
In the case of a  corporation with a majority shareholder,  a takeover can only be successful if 
this shareholder agrees,  as  the old  shareholder will  only  sell  his shares with attached voting 
rights  if he is  compensated  with  a  higher block  price.  This  also  tends  to raise  the voting 
premium. Hypothesis 5 tries to catch all of  these factors. 
Hypothesis 5:  The concentration of votes  and  the  existence  of a major  shareholder has  an 
influence on the voting premium. The higher the concentration of shares, the higher the voting 
premIUm. 
In order to test Hypothesis 55,  the sample corporations are classified into five groups.  A higher 
number  of the  group  indicates  a  higher  degree  of  concentration  and  assumes  better 
opportunities  for  the  influential  shareholders  to  reap  private  benefits.  Shareholders  of 
5 In order to derive a similar hypothesis for the case of Sweden, Rydvist (1986) applies a specific gametheoretic 
model to  shares with different voting rights.  An  important condition for  the applicability of his model  is  that 
the direct and indirect voting  rights of every shareholder are known.  In  the Swedish  case,  this condition  is 
fulfilled.  But this  is not  the case for  many companies in France. French law requires that only the  range of a -11-
corporations with only small  shareholders are not in  a position to have private benefits since 
their possibility  of influencing  the  firm's  management  is  very  limited.  There  exists  a  clear 
separation  of ownership  and  control.  The  personal  benefits  derived  from  voting rights  are 
therefore very limited, and  the valuation of the shares should be based only on  the expected 
future cash-flows.  In  comparison to  widely  held  corporations,  the  possibilities  of extracting 
private  benefits  are  only  a  little  higher  in  corporations  in  which  the  state  is  the  major 
shareholder, provided that the government  is  controlled by the  parliament  and  wishes to  be 
reelected. Private benefits are most likely to be found in corporations which belong to a group, 
and in family-dominated firms.  A list  which indicates the  number of companies in each group 
for all years covered in  this study can be found in Appendix 3.  The following list presents the 
general characteristics of  the five different groups of corporations: 
N  group  1:  no  major  shareholder,  many  small  investors,  often  after  privatization  with 
"noyeau dur" (core shareholders) 
S  group 2:  state company with direct and indirect control of more than  50% of  the voting 
rights by the state 
G  group 3:  company belongs to  a group  which  controls  more  than  50%  of the  voting 
rights 
M  group 4:  no majority shareholder, but control of  the company through a family acting in 
concert with friends and other companies 
F  group 5:  family/employee control of more than 50% of the voting  rights  held  directly 
and indirectly 
After having presented the five  hypotheses,  the following  section will  analyze the regression 
data for longitudinal and cross sectional-regressions. Furthermore I will analyze the valuation 
of  the voting certificates CDV. 
5  Regression analysis 
5.1  Analysis of the voting right certificats 
The  explicit  possibility  to  trade  voting  rights  on  the French  stock  exchange  provides  the 
opportunity to test directly whether the Hypothesis that the voting rights are valuable.  Manne 
(1965)  suggested  that  if there  is  a  majority  shareholder,  the  voting  rights  of the  other 
shareholders would be worthless.  This assumption  can be refused  by analyzing  the  cases  of 
L'Oreal  and  Robertet.  AJthough  both  companies  have been under family  control with more 
direct indiddual invcstor's ownership intcrcst (5%,  10%,  20%,  1/3,  50%,  2/3)  is  made  public.  Therefore  the 
exact percentagcs and indirect sharcholdings arc not known, and a transfer of Rydvist's model is not possible. -12-
than 66,66% of the votes so that additional votes should have no value according to  Manne, 
their CDV have always had a positive price quote (see Appendix 7). 
The quotes  of CDVs on the French  stock  exchange  allow  a  simple  and  direct  test  of the 
hypothesis that the value of the voting right of equation (1) equals the difference between the 
value of  a voting share and that of a non-voting C1. If  this is the case and the value correspond 
to the quoted price for CDV, the quote of  the voting share of company i would equal the sum 
of  the quotations for CI and CDV (equation 6).  This can then be transformed to calculate the 
variable (RCDT/)  in equation 7: 
vs
i  = CT + CDV
i 
I  .  I  t 
i  CJ; +CDV/ 
RCD~ =  VSi 
I 
(6) 
(7) 
In testing equations (6) and (7), the average is calculated by only those days t have been taken 
into account on which all three kinds of  securities of the company i were traded (see Appendix 
2,  column 5).  The empirical result is  that in  all  but two cases
6  the price of the  voting shares 
exceeds the sum of the prices of the CIs  and  the CDVs by  between  1 and 5  percent.  This 
results show clearly that CI  and  CDV do  not  fully  reflect the  value  of a  voting share with 
exception of St.  Fiacre and Groupe Victoire.  Furthermore the  results indicate  that arbitrage 
profits  can  be  realized  on  long-time  average  by  buying  a  CI  and  a  CDV and selling  the 
resulting voting share. 
However, it is  important to notice that the French legislation only permits CI-holders to  buy 
CDVs which leads to an automatic restitution of a voting share. Each CDV can only be traded 
once and the percentage of CIs in  equity capital decreases with  every trading  of CDVs (see 
Appendix 10). 
The observed price differences in  prices of 1  %-5% can be explained by two factors.  The first 
explanation deals with  the  strong legal  limitation of CDV trading.  During takeover attempts 
CDVs can only help to achieve a majority of votes after purchasing CIs.  Since the CDVs are 
obligatorily issued as registered certificates and the issuing company has to be notified in case 
of  a restitution, it is impossible to accumulate a stock ofCDVs in secret. 
A  second  possible reason for the price difference could  be the low  level  of liquidity of the 
CDVs. The available, although incomplete, data on trading volumes for CDVs indicate clearly that the absolute number ofCDVs traded is indeed low. It can be assumed that the low number 
leads to a very low number of contracts signed.  In some cases, CDV papers there had not been 
a single registered trade during several weeks, which makes an  adequate pricing by the market 
difficult. 
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5.2  Cross-sectional regressions 
Cross-sectional regressions analyze share prices  of different companies at  a specific  point  of 
time. An annual average of the premium VRPyear as dependent variable was calculated based 
on  the  daily  values  of VRP.  The  independent  variables  are  calculated  based  upon  the 
hypotheses derived above. All  results reported here have been checked and found to be robust 
with respect to heteroscedasticity,  autocorrelation and multicollinearity.  In order to  increase 
the sample size for the testing of Hypotheses 1 and 2, the data for all  companies and all sample 
years were pooled into a single regression. 
The Ho-hypothesis that the dividend  difference (Hypothesis 1)  has  no influence  on  VRPyear 
cannot be  rejected.  The expected negative sign  of the slope for ADiff cannot be found  (see 
Table 1).  The regression result of RDiff shows the negative sign,  but  the significance  level  as 
well  as  the  R2-value  are  too  low  to  be  economically  meaningful.  In  calculating  the two 
regressions referring to absolute and  relative differences of dividends,  I make the assumption 
that the amount of  the dividend is already known in the year for which it is  paid,  although the 
actual  dividend  disbursement  only  takes place  in  the  following  year.8  These two regression 
results support the assumption introduced in  section 3, namely that a correction of  the quotes 
due to additional dividend rights is not necessary. 
Hypothesis 2 that a possible revival  of the voting right for ADP-shares influences the voting 
premium could only be evaluated for the sample years  1986 to 1994 (Table 1, equation 3). For 
1995  and  1996  there  was  no  difference  between the  companies  since all  of them  paid  the 
statuary dividends.  As  the  independent variable  for  testing Hypothesis 2,  a dummy-variable 
R  VR  =  1 was used in those cases in which the corporation did not pay the statuary dividend for 
year 1.  The regression shows that the  voting premium  is  positively  correlated with the non-
6  The exceptions are Groupe  Victoire and  Sl.  Fiacre.  Groupe  Victoire was  part  of a takeo\'er  battle  in  1989 
which might explain the  high a\'erage.  St.  Fiacre is characterized by  only 28  observations  in the sample period 
( I  CJ89-19(6) which does not allow an interpretation of the average. 
o  On the other hand there  111a\  be situations when  the  price for  CDVs  increases.  They  are not  well  suited  for 
speCUlation. which is  not possible due to the legal circumstances under which  the CDVs were created.  Investors 
with a large number of CDVs  must be  "old"  in\'estors which  had voting rights at  the time when the  CIs were 
issued  If these investors sell their CDVs they will decrease their influence in the company.  This will only be an 
except'ional  case,  for  example  with  desin\'~stI11ent decisions  or  lucrative  takeover offers,  which  leads  to  a 
limited liquidity as \vell and would increase the price for CDVs. -14-
payment of statutory dividends and this result leads to a significance  level  of 6%. Among the 
sample, Mors and CSEE are the  only two corporations  with  RVR=1  due to  not fully  paid 
dividends. All other companies paid dividends regularly. 
Table 1: Cross-sectional regressions for absolute dividend and relative dividend 
differences and for a voting right revival 
* - 10% significance level 
equation  constant  variable  R2  significance  N 
{t-value)  (t-value}  level 
(1) VRPJcart= a + Adifftx  0,6427  0,0006  0,0001  0,8668  65 
(12.748)*  (0,168) 
(2) VRPJcart= a + Rdifftx  0,6531  -0,0003  0,0003  0,8789  65 
(13,359)*  (-0,153) 
(3) VRPycart= a + RVRtx  0,6771  -0,2299  0,0532  0,0626  65 
(13.664)*  (-1,895)* 
The results for Hypothesis 3, that the capitalization influences the  premium, are presented in 
Table 2.  The explanation of the variability as well as the significance level  are not satisfactory 
for most individual sample years. Only the pooled regression shows a significant result with the 
expected  negative  sign  for  the  independent  variable.  The regressions take into  account  all 
companies in  order to increase the sample size.  For the companies with CIs, Hypothesis 3  is 
only partly valid.  For every CI issued, the old  shareholders with VS  received CDVs  so  as  to 
have a constant voting power. In  case of a takeover, the potential buyer would  not only have 
to buy the majority of the voting shares, but CDVs to control the majority of votes.  Since  he 
could only buy CDVs after buying the same number ofCTs, his investment is expanded to total 
equity and not limited to voting equity.9 
Table 3 shows that the significance level for Hypothesis 4 is below 10% for 1986, 1992, 1993, 
and 1996. For these years, the R2s are acceptable, and the negative signs of the variables are as 
expected.  The regression over all  companies and all  years also  shows the  expected  negative 
slope and a high significance level of under 1  %.  The slope is  very flat and  the  constant has a 
very high value for the annual as well  as for the pooled regressions which can be due to other 
factors influencing VRPyear.  This assumption will further be dealt with later on  in the context 
of a  multiple  regression.  With  regard to  the  legal  circumstances of CI  and  CDV the same 
problems appear as in Table 2. 
B A different approach (VRPyeart = a + ADifft.jx  and  VRPyeart = a + RDifft.\x),  which  is  not  presented,  does 
not lead to any better results. 
9  An  alternative approach only  with  companies who issued ADP shares, \vhich  is not  presented in  this paper, 
leads to the same resulls. -15-
Table 2: Cross-sectional regressions for capitalization 
I  VRP~'eart= a + Captx {voting shares without CDV)  * - 10% significance le'Vel 
)'ear  constant  yariable  R1  significance  N 
{t-value)  (t-value)  level 
1986  0,4091  -0,0001  0,3366  0,0376  13 
(7,732)*  (-2,363)* 
1987  0,4451  -0,0001  0,1193  0,1901  16 
(7,563)*  (  -1,377) 
1988  0,4864  -0,0003  0,0147  0,6215  20 
(6,024 )*  (-0,503 ) 
1989  0,7768  -0,0001  0,0025  0,8248  22 
(6,648)*  (-0,224) 
1990  0,8521  -0,0003  0,0170  0,5730  22 
(7,106)*  (-0,574) 
1991  0,7214  -0,0007  0,0001  0,9883  21 
(5,842)*  (-0,015) 
1992  0,6646  0,0002  0,0001  0,9622  20 
(5,290)*  (0,048) 
1993  0,6009  -0,0003  0,0874  0,2055  22 
(5,601)*  (-1,313) 
1994  0,4597  -0,0004  0,1885  0,0633  20 
(6,379)*  (-1,987)* 
1995  0.4353  -0,0003  0,0873  0,2494  17 
(5,252)*  (-1,198) 
1996  0,4516  -0,0002  0,0844  0,2935  14 
(4,447)*  ( -1,095) 
pooled  0,5902  -0,0003  0,031  0,01l3  207 
(18,353)*  (  -2,555)* 
Table 3: Cross-sectional regressions for ratio voting equity capital/total equity capital 
tvRP~'cart= a + RelSlllltX {voting shares without CDV)I  * - 10% significance le\'el 
year  constant  yariable  R1  significance  N 
{t-vltlue}  (t-value}  level 
1986  1,5563  -0,0150  0,3516  0,0327  13 
(3,083 )*  (-2,443)* 
1987  0,8087  -0,0049  0,0242  0,5647  16 
(1,144)  (-0,590) 
1988  1,2246  -0,0088  0,0436  0,3908  20 
(1.410)  (-0,881) 
1989  1,2661  -0,0057  0,0094  0,6677  22 
(1,088)  (  -0,436) 
1990  1,9890  -0,0130  0,0503  0,3282  22 
(1,693)  (-1,004 ) 
1991  2,3746  -0,0183  0,0999  0,1744  21 
(2,022)*  (-1,414) 
1992  3,7450  -0,0334  0,3617  0,0050  20 
(3,871)*  (-3,194)* 
1993  2,5725  -0,0221  0,2370  0,0295  22 
(2,943)*  (  -2.364)* 
1994  1,7110  -0,0142  0,2257  0,0540  20 
(2,688)*  (  -2,091)* 
1995  1,3674  -0,0107  0,1282  0.1582  17 
(2,046 )*  (-1,485) 
1996  2.4721  -0,0226  0,4570  0,0057  14 
(3,898)*  (  -3,308)* 
pooled  1,6282  -0,0121  0,0673  0,0002  207 
(5,681 )*  (-3,779)* -16-
Table 4 presents the test results for  Hypothesis 5 concerning the influence of the shareholder 
structure  on  the  voting  premium  VRPyear.  Dummy-variables  with  a  value  of 1  for  the 
individual  shareholder structure of company i  in  year  t  and  a  value  of 0 for  all  other four 
groups are employed.  In order to avoid perfect multicollinearity, the regression model  includes 
four variables, the remaining dummy-group is reflected by the constant which is group F in this 
case. Therefore the constant cannot be interpreted as in the tables presented before. 
Table 4:  Cross-sectional regressions for shareholdel' structure 
I  VRPycart:::; a + structx  * - 10% significance level 
)"car  constant  N  S  G  M  adj, R2  N 
{t-valucl  {t-valuel  {t-value1  {t-valuel  {t-valuel 
1986  0,3124  -0,2412  0,1197  0,0385  0,3941  13 
(4,735)*  (-2,111)*  (1,352)  0,337 
1987  0,4850  -0,3651  -0,0587  -0,1323  0,2476  16 
(6,781)*  (-2,728)*  (-0,606)  (-1,133) 
1988  0,5785  -0,4182  -0,1046  -0,1466  0,0252  20 
(4,780)*  (-1,847)*  (  -0,693)  (  -0,742) 
1989  1,0558  -0,8332  -0,3764  -0,2282  0,2016  22 
(G.838)*  (-2,698)*  (-1,961)*  -0,853 
1990  1.1358  -0,7386  -0.4347  -0,5472  0,1393  22 
(G,3..J.4)*  H,0(2)*  (-1,953)*  (-1,764)* 
1991  1.0420  -0,5494  -0,4568  -0,4069  0,0781  21 
(5,743)*  (-1,514)  (-1,950)*  (-1,295) 
1992  0,9878  -0,5145  -0,5236  -0,2200  0,1271  20 
(5.558)*  (-1,447)  (-2,282)*  (-0,715) 
1993  0,7490  -0,6031  -0,5110  -0.2625  -0,1814  0,1066  22 
(5.()..1.8)*  (-2,347)*  (-1,302)  (  -1,298)  (-0,706) 
1994  0.5720  -0,4491  -0,2375  -0,2669  0,2824  20 
(6,363 )*  (-3,159)*  (-1,939)*  (-1,714) 
1995  0.5659  -0,4631  -0,1617  -0,2694  0,1692  17 
(4.842)*  (  -2,426)*  (-1,022)  (-1,412) 
1996  0.5721  -0,4489  -0,1714  0,2639  0,0886  14 
(  4,238)*  (  -2,036)*  (-0,846)  (-1,177) 
The annual  results in  Table 4 clearly show that group F with  family  companies  leads  to  high 
values  of VRP,  and  groups Nand S to  the lowest  values  (see  also  Appendix  6).  All  of the 
results for  the  constant and  most of the  variables  are  significant under a  lO%-level  and  thus 
support Hypothesis  5.  The level  of explanation  of the variability varies between 8%  in  1996 
and  39% in  1986. These findings  are consistent with Nicodano's (1998) for Italy.  The author 
shows that  the  premium  is  higher  for  holding  companies  issuing  non-voting  shares  than  for 
similar operating companies with non-voting equity.  These pyramid structures can be found  in 
France in some companies of  groups G, M, and F (e.g. Taittinger). -17-
In order to increase the sample size and to analyze possible joint effects of different factors, I 
used multiple regressions (Table 5).  Equation (1) shows the result of a pooled regression with 
the  shareholder  structure  strllc  as  the  independent  variable.  The  constant  as  well  as  the 
coefficients of all  four  variables  are  significant,  and  the  regression  can  explain  18%  of the 
variability.  Tables 2 and  3 showed  relatively  high  results  for  the  constants.  In  order to  test 
whether the variables capitalization (Cap) and the fraction of voting capital RelSha can explain 
the voting  premium  when  they  are  considered  in  combination  with  the  variable  struc,  two 
additional  regressions  were  estimated.  In  comparison  with  equation  (1),  equation  (2)  adds 
RelSha as  an  independent  variable.  The  adjusted  multiple  coefficient  of determination  R2 
increases to 21 %. If Cap is added as third factor of influence, the adjusted R2 goes up to 23%, 
but the slope coefficient of Cap is weakly positive which  is not consistent  with  Hypothesis  3. 
This regression suggests that a higher capitalization is  correlated with a higher  premium.  The 
constants and all variables of equations (2) and (3) are significant. The variables of  Hypotheses 
1 and 2 could not be included since they are limited to companies having issued ADP-shares. 
Table 5: Cross-sectional multiple regl'essions 
I  VRPyeart= H + b\x\+  .......... +hnx n  * -10% significance level 
equation  constant  N  S  G  M  RelSha  elll)  adj. R2  N 
{t-value)  (t-value)  (t-value)  (t-ntlue)  ~t-\'alue)  {t-value}  (t-value} 
(1)  0,7584  -0,6349  -0,4844  -0,2983  -0,2598  0,1807  207 
(16,227)*  (-5.753)*  (-4,634)*  (-4,995)*  (-3,278)* 
(2)  1,4972  -0,5693  -0,4510  -0,2265  -0,2908  -0,0083  0,2113  207 
(5,383 )*  (-4,976)*  (-4,412)*  (-3,786)*  (-3,767*)  (-2,663)* 
(3)  1,6719  -0,7920  -0,5840  -0,2090  -0,2892  -0,0107  0,0004  0,2345  207 
(5.928)*  (-5.610)*  (-5,178)*  (-3.521)*  (-3,803)*  (-3,349)*  (2,620)* 
Tests of Means (t-value) 
N  S  G  M 
F VS.  10,10***  7,20***  4,004***  3,53*** 
N vs.  -2,89***  -5,92***  -5,38*** 
S "s,  -3,07***  -2,81 *** 
G "s,  -0,05 
* - 10% significance leYel;  ** - 5<% significance level; *** - 1% significance level 
The results of the cross-sectional regressions show that  the voting  premium  vRPyear can  be 
best explained by a multiple regression with shareholder structure, percentage of voting capital 
and  capitalization  as  independent  variables  with  the  shareholder  structure  as  the  most 
influencial factor. For all  other variables the significance is far beyond an acceptable level. The 
following section will use a different approach to analyze the hypotheses. -18-
5.3  Longitudinal regressions 
In contrast to cross-sectional regressions, longitudinal regressions analyze the voting premium 
for the same company during the total sample period in order to test the hypotheses of section 
3. The results may provide additional information as to which of  the independent variables has 
a  strong  influence  on  the  premium  for  an  individual  company.  Since  the  number of  all 
corporations in  the sample was already very limited,  I made regressions for those corporations 
for which a minimum of four years'  data was  available.  With respect to  Hypotheses  3 and  4, 
Tables 9 and 10 show only the regression results for the companies with a significance level  of 
10% or better. 
It was only possible to test Hypothesis 1 for one company (Legrand) since for  all  others the 
absolute dividend  difference  was constant (Appendix 4).  Mors was  not  included in  the  test 
since the number of observations is  too limited.  The result in Table 6 can  only explain  16%  of 
the variability, and the significance of  the results is far from an acceptable level. 
Table 6:  Longitudinal regression for absolute dividend difference 
company  constant 
(t-yaluc) 
Legrand  0,1653 
(0,531 ) 
yariable 
(t-value) 
0,0770 
(1,282) 
* - 10% significance level 
significance  Durbin- N 
level  Watson 
0,1544  0,2319  0,4849  II 
Table 7 presents the  results  of the tests for  an  influence  of the relative  dividend  difference. 
CSEE is  excluded  here,  since  this  company  paid  no  regular  dividend  and  had  only  later 
payments.  The  results  for  the  remaining  four  companies  with  a  fixed  absolute  dividend 
difference of voting and  ADP-shares do  not permit the  conclusion that there is a significant 
relationship between the dividend difference and the voting premium.  The low  values for  the 
Durbin-Watson coefficients in Tables 6 and 7 show that autocorrelation may be  a problem.  In 
spite of this  reservation,  the  longitudinal  test  for  an  influence  of the absolute and  relative 
dividend differences support the results of the cross-sectional  regressions  in  section  5.2,  and 
this seems to be important, as these  results were insignificant as well. 
Table 7: Longitudinal regressions for relative dividend difference 
I  VRPycart= a + Rdifftx  * - 1(1% significance level 
company  constant  variable  RZ  significance  Durbin- N 
{t-value)  {t-value)  level  Watson 
Casino  0,4435  -0,0202  0,0088  0,7838  1,0995  11 
(1.204)  (-0.283 ) 
Essilor  0,5794  0,0117  0,0077  0,7976  0,5736  11 
(1,413)  (0,264) 
Roussel Uelar  0,8332  ~0,0029  0,0108  0,7753  0,5027  10 
(3,988)*  (-0,295) 
Sagem  1,2824  0,0080  0,0291  0,6161  0,5163 
(2,734)*  (-0,519) -19-
With  regard to the  regression  for  a possible  revival  of the voting  right  (Hypothesis  2)  it is 
important to notice that only Mors  and CSEE had  irregular dividend  payments  which  led  to a 
dummy-variable RVR = 1.  Since for Mars the sample period was very short, the regressions are 
limited to the  case of CSEE.  The result  can  only explain  25%  of the variability  with  a low t-
value. 
Table 8:  Longitudinal regressions for a l'evival of the voting right 
company  constant 
(t-value) 
CSEE  1,1717 
(2,467) 
variable 
(t-value) 
-0,2223 
(-1.271) 
* - 10% significance level 
R2  significance  DUI'bin- N 
level  Watson 
0,2122  0,2506  1,3108  8 
The acknowledgement of the voting right is often anticipated by investors. In the case of CSEE 
the voting right was granted to the  ADP-shareholders on December  12,  1994 and their ADP-
shares were exchanged  1: 1 for  voting  shares.  The  development of the  VRP  shows  that  the 
difference between the prices of  both shareclasses started to decrease in April 1993 (see Figure 
1).  In the case of the  privatization  of BNP  the  voting  premium also  decreased  from  30% in 
October 1994  to 0%,  and  this  was  almost certainly  in  anticipation on the  exchange  of CI  for 
voting shares as decided by the special shareholder meeting on December 7,  1994. 
Figure 1:  Development of the voting premium in anticipation of an  acknowledgment of 
the voting right 
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Table 9 shows that  there  is  a possible  influence of the  capitalization on  the voting  premium 
(Hypothesis 3) for  seven  companies,  which  is  statistically significant at  the  10  percent level. 
With the exception of Essilor,  all  of these companies had issued CIs. However,  the  expected 
negative  sign  of the  coefficient  can  only  be  observed for four  companies.  For  the  remaining 
three  companies,  the  slope  was  weakly  positive.  The  explanation  of the variability  is  very 
acceptable with a maximum of  64% with acceptable t-values. -20-
When testing Hypothesis 4, only six companies are found to  have a significance level of under 
10% (see Table 10), and the expected negative sign can only be found for four companies.  The 
results for Piper-Heidsieck and Robertet are significant at the  1  %-levei. 
Table 9: Longitudinal regressions for capitalization 
I  VRP~'eart= a + Captx {voting shares without CDVs2  * - 10% significance level 
company  constant  variable  Rl  significance  Durbin- N 
{t-value)  {t-yalue)  Icyel  Watson 
Eridania  0,4365  -0,0001  0,5820  0,0103  2,2632  10 
(8,028)*  (-3,337)* 
Essilor  0,9978  -0,0006  0,3407  0,0594  1,0732  11 
(6,010)*  (-2,157)* 
GroUI)C Victoire  0,2672  0,0002  0,8338  0,0869  2,5679  4 
(1,417)  (3,168)* 
Lou\TC  0,3349  0,0002  0,3848  0,0417  1,1803  11 
(1,302)  (2,373)* 
Pipcr-Hcidsieck  0,7130  -0,0003  0,4569  0,0224  1,6234  11 
(5,912)*  (-2,752)* 
Robcrtct  1,2571  -0,0013  0,6415  0,0169  1,6353  8 
(7,363)*  (  -3,276)* 
Taittinger  0,1579  0,0004  0,6214  0,0039  0,9549  11 
(0,835)  (3,843)* 
Table 10: Longitudinal regressions for voting share percentage 
~RP~'cart=  a + RelShatx ("oting shares without CDV)I  * -10% significance level 
company  constant  variable  Rl  significance  Durbin- N 
(t-value)  (t-value)  Icvel  Watson 
Eridania  1,0882  -0,0087  0,3138  0,0921  1,1929  10 
(2,576)*  (-1,913)* 
Louvre  -5,0049  0,0679  0,5861  0,0060  1,1375  11 
(-3,018)*  (3,570)* 
Pillcr-Heidsieck  2,0364  -0,0171  0,4960  0,0155  1,4079  11 
(3,722)*  (-2,976)* 
Robcrtct  56,8007  -0,6056  0,8367  0,0015  3,0427  8 
(5,616)*  (  -5,545)* 
Roussel U  claf  2,5097  -0,0199  0,2834  0,0918  0,4341  11 
(2,660)*  (-1,887)* 
Total  -0,7675  0,0116  0,3167  0,0715  0,5241  11 
(-1,460)  (2,042)* 
Taken together,  the  longitudinal  regressions  indicate  that in  particular  Hypotheses 3 and 4 
provide an explanation of  the average annual premiums for some corporations.  This  allows the 
conclusion that not all companies influence the cross-sectional results in the same way, but that 
the  capitalization  and  the  part  of voting  capital  of some  companies  influence  the  voting 
premium more than for other companies. 
So  far  this  paper  has  analyzed  the  voting  premium  from  a  global  perspective  covering  all 
companies falling  into  a certain category.  The following section  will  present  a case study in 
order to  analyze  the  development  of the  voting  premium  of two  companies  which  were 
involved in a specific event. -21-
6  Case study Casino/Promodes 
As in  the neighboring countries,  food  retailers face increasing competition in  France,  which 
leads to decreasing profits. Higher margins can only be  realized by  reducing purchsing prices, 
which requires a higher market share. Internal growth can only be realized with great difficulty 
since  new  "hypermarch6"  shops  with  huge  areas  are  no  longer  allowed  since  1996  (loi 
Raffarin), so that external growth remains the only alternative in the French market. 
In this situation, the second largest French food retailer, Promo  des,  made a takeover bid to the 
sixth largest one,  Casino-Guichard, on  September  1,  1997.  Since both companies  had issued 
two  classes  of shares,  an  analysis  of the  voting  premium  for  both  companies  during  the 
takeover contest is of special interest. Rumors were already spread several months  before the 
formal offer, which had resulted in  an increase of Casino's voting right premium from 17% as 
of August 1,  to 27% one month later. Analysts expected an  increase of the premium since the 
voting rights  were deemed decisive for the  success of an  eventual  offer.  Casino  had  issued 
ADP in  1983  which made up 21 % of  total equity capital in 1996. The company was  controlled 
by two major shareholders: Rallye
lO  and the successors of  the founder (see Figure 2). Rallye is 
a  holding  company  whose  majority  (75%)  belongs  to  lean-Charles Naouri.  Promodes  had 
issued CI in  1987 which made up  1,5% of  the nominal  equity capital in  1996.  The company is 
owned by the Halley family. I I 
Figure 2:Casino share capital and voting rights as of December 31, 1996
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On September 1, Promodes offered 340 FF for one voting share VS and  272 FFl'for one ADP 
(which implies a voting premium of 25%), provided that shareholders would  sell at least  50% 
of  the Casino voting rights.
13  Before the suspension of trading until  September 8, Casino had a 
voting premium of 27%.  On September 2' the supervisory board of Casino classified the  offer 
10 Casino grants double voting rights after 4 years, Rallye was therefore able to  increase its part of voting rights 
to 42% as from October 25,  1997.  .  ' 
11  Further information with regard to the percentage of voting rights owned by  the famIly are 110t  published by 
the company and were not available upon request.  . 
12 The 400 successors agreed in 1994 only to act unified with Antoine GUIchard as speaker. -22-
as  unfriendly  and  bought  the  supermarket  chain  Franprix  in  order  to  demonstrate  its 
determination to  remain  independent.  The  voting right  premium  of Promodes  doubled during 
five days to  30"l~) on Septcmbcr 4 (see Figure 3). 
Figure  3:  Voting  premium  for  Casino  and  Promodes  between  August  1,  1997,  and 
JUIlUl1l1'31, 1998 
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After resumption of trading the  quotations of both the voting shares and the  ADPs of Casino 
increased,  and  the  I ·Ia'  remained  unchanged  until  another  suspension  of trading  occured on 
September  12 (see Appendix 8). The premium for Promodes fluctuated around 22%. 
Since Ra\lye was not willing to  sell their shares, the success of the takeover initiative depended 
totally  on  the decision  of the  successors.  On  September  12,  they  decided  not to  sell  and to 
support  Rallye  Both  groups  together  controlled  the  majority  of votes.  On  September  14, 
Rallye  made  a counter  L)fTer.  In  contrast  to  Promodes,  Rallye  did  not  offer  cash  for  Casino 
shares  but  an  exchange  of voting  and  non-voting  shares  into  a convertible  loan  with  a 
conversion  right  for  Casino  voting  shares.  The  stock  exchange  commission  COB  did  not 
permit  this  countcr  ofTer  due  to  what  seem  to  have  been  doubts  concerning  the ability of 
investors to evaluate  the  otTer  made  to them.  Promodes was  perceived  to be strengthened by 
this decision, and  the valuc of its voting rights increased rapidly to 33%. The  market expected 
an increase of the ofTer of Prolllodcs in order to  persuade the successors' group. 
On September 25 Promocles incleed increased its offer to 375 FF for a voting share and 300 FF 
for an  ADP (/'/(P 25~/o) or alternatively an  exchange of 7 Casino voting shares for  1 Promodes 
voting share. The ne\v alternative was introduced to  convince the  successors who did not want 
to  loose  their  inllucnce  in  the  company.  During  the  following  day  Rallye  published  a  new 
counter otTer  which  was  accepted  by  the  COB,  although  the comparison with the Promodes 
offer  remained  clit1icult  since  Rallyc  now  offered  a  Rallye  convertible  loan  into  Casino  or 
13 For an  on~r\'ic\\ of llll! dllll!rl!nl clcnlS sec Appendix  9, -23-
Rallye  shares.  This  new  counter  offer  was  not  conditional  on  a  minimum  of voting  shares 
offered. 
Trading of Casino shares resumed on September 30, and high volumes of shares were changed 
hands.  The price increased by  8 percent, but they remained  at 361  FF  for a voting  share and 
278  FF  for an ADP,  which was below the  Promodes offer.  Surprisingly, the  voting premium 
stayed at  29  percent, whereas Promodes had  only offered 25  percent as an implicit price of  the 
voting right.  The development of the  quotes and  the  voting  premium  can be  interpreted  as  a 
reaction of the investors to the unceliainty of the outcome of the contest. Both offers had the 
same duration and the investors had a wait-and-see attitude. 
On  October 4,  the group of successors met  again,  but  could  not  find a common position with 
respect to which  offer to  support. A decision in favor of Promodes would have been decisive 
for its offer.  The premium for Casino stayed constant in contrast to the  premium of  Promodes 
which decreased from 28% to 13% since investors felt that Promo des would not be successful. 
During the  following  days,  the  premium  of Casino  stayed  around  28%.  On October  29,  it 
increased rapidly to 36% after lean-Charles Naouri had announced his decision to  make  use of 
an exchange ofBSA
1
.\ which increased  his  percentage in voting rights from  42,9% to 47,9%. 
With this decision and the fact that the stock exchange commission did not demand a new offer 
from  Rallye,  Promodes had  actually lost the battle apart from  a contrary court decision  since 
Rallye could count on the votes of  the personnel and a large part of  the successors to achieve a 
majority.  During the following months Casino had a constant voting premium of around 28% 
again  until  the end  of December when  Promodes  and  Casino/Rallye signed  a contract  which 
officially marked  the end  of the takeover contest. The  premium decreased from  30% to 24%. 
The companies agreed to cooperate in  international non-food purchasing and  to  consult each 
other in  case of important capital variations.  The new shareholder structure of  Casino after the 
exchange procedures can be seen in Figure 4. 
14  Casino BSA  (bon  de  sOllscription  d'action) could be exchanged  I BSA =  I voting share at  any time: BSA 
were issued before the start of the takeover battle. -24-
Figure 4: Casino share capital and voting rights as of March 15, 1998 
share capital 
source  CU!J.lno annual report 1997 
""dely spread 
.. -__  ~!,.1.':" 
succ.esSors 
9,7% 
voting rights 
source. Casino annual report 1997 
Rally. 
60,8% 
employees 
---~ 
Widely spread 
27,9% 
By  analyzing  the  premIum  of Promodes  in  Figure  3  we  see  a  steady  increase  from  the 
beginning of  November until the end of the takeover contest and the premium remained at this 
relatively  high  level  even  in  January  1998.  This  fact  results  from  the  sharper increase of the 
price of the voting shares in comparison to that of the CIs. 
The following section analyzes the significance of non-voting capital for French companies and 
puts the French empirical results in an international comparison, 
7  International comparison 
7.1  The significance of  non-voting shares for equity financing in France 
The main  finding  of the  paper,  namely  a high  average  voting  premium  in France,  implies that 
issuing  non-voting shares  is  simply  very  expensive  in  France.  A possible consequence of the 
high premium can  be seen  in  Figure 5 which shows that the use of non-voting shares has been 
declining  over time  since the late  1980s.  As  it  seems,  corporations try  to use  alternative,  but 
less costly, means to achieve the same results as those which non-voting shares were originally 
meant for. 
Figure 5:  Capitalization of nOll-voting shares 
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However, as Figure 5 also shows, non-voting shares have never played an important role in the 
equity  financing  of French  companies.  The  number  of corporations which  issued  non-voting -25-
shares  as  well  as  their  fraction  of total  capitalization  have  always been  quite  limited.  Since 
1986/87, there was a constant  reduction of non-voting shares traded  at the  stock exchange. 
The stock exchange has  started to  playa much more  important role for equity and for  debt. ls 
At the end of 1996, out of 770 French shares publicly traded, only  19 were non-voting,  which 
corresponds to  0,54 percent of total  market  capitalization.  This  tendency  continued  in  1997 
with the deli sting of  Roussel-Uc\af and Piper-Heidsieck. 
There seem to be four causes for this development: 
The first  reason  has  to  do  with  changes  in  the  concept  which  had  guided  the  privatization 
process in  France since  the  early  1980s.  During the  period  1983-87,  state-owned companies 
and  especially the major banks  had  issued  CIs  and  CIPs.  In  fact,  these  legal  instruments had 
been  created  specifically for  their needs.  With  the  introduction  of non-voting  shares  whose 
voting rights cannot revive the state had created for itself the possibility to increase the  equity 
capital  of  state-owned  companies  without  having  to  give  any  voting  rights  to  new 
shareholders.  However,  most  of the  privatized  companies  have  since  exchanged  their  non-
voting shares for  voting shares.  The state was no  longer majority shareholder so there was no 
need for a dual-class share system anymore (Reinhard  1988).  The  delisting of  the  second class 
of shares of the  same  company  saves  money  for  the  listing  fee  and  facilitates  the  relevant 
administrative work. 
The second reason for the insignificance of non-voting shares can be seen in the French system 
of permitting double votes for voting shares.  As already pointed out above, the annual general 
meeting  can  grant  two  votes  to  one  share  if that  share  was  held  by  the same  investor  for  a 
minimum  of four  years.  Non-voting  shares  are  one  possibility to increase  the  equity  capital 
without losing influence in the corporation.  But double votes can  achieve the same result and 
prevent unwanted takeovers equally well, but at lower cost (Desbrieres  1994).  In the case of a 
capital  increase  all  newly  issued  ordinary  shares  get  one  vote,  but  this  is  evidently  less 
important  if old  shareholders  have  double  votes.  In  the  case  of a takeover,  a bidder  who 
needed  the  majority of votes  in  order to  gain  control  of the  corporation,  would  have to buy 
more than the majority of shares. 
The third reason  why  non-voting  shares  are  not  "needed  II  as  a means  to  secure  control  of a 
corporation can be seen  in  special features  of the French corporate governance system.  There 
is a high  incidence of cross-holdings between French companies, and wealthy families still play 
15  A study by the SBF - Bourse de Paris (1997) shows that the number of corporations listed has ~ecreased since 
1  <)<)0.  but  ti;e  nominal  \'alue of French equities and of French bonds  listed has increased  steadily  for  25  years 
(SBF - Bourse de Paris 1998). -26-
an important role not only  as owners but also  in the management of those corporations which 
they  dominate,  16  rvlorill  (1996)  provided  evidence  that  1110st  privatized  former  state-owned 
enterprises are  part of two large  networks of cross-ownership  and  "strategic  shareholdings", 
Eleven  of the  :21  companies,  which  he  mentions  as  being  parts of these networks had issued 
non-voting  shares  in  the  past.  With  the  exception  of Bouygues,  these  are  all  former  state-
owned  companies  fix  \vhich  non-voting  shares  do  not  exist  anymore  or  have  became 
completely  unimportant n  The  OEeD  (1997)  points  out  that  this  system  of "cross-
participatioll  has nut (!}Jab/eel  the  recelllly privatized companies  to  adopt a  truly  'private' 
.\J'stCI11 (!f c'mp()rale K(}I'l'maIlCe", Thus,  still today there are only a few corporations in France 
which  havc  all  of their  shares  held  by  a large  number  of small  shareholders,  In addition  the 
shareholders  represented  on  supervisOl)'  boards  typically  have  very  limited  opportunities  to 
control  thc  management  in  the  first  place,  According  to  FrankslMayer  (1995),  the French 
corporate  governance  system  is  an  "insider  control  system"  in  which  the  insiders  control 
themselves instead of  being controlled by outsiders via a capital market which also functions  as 
a market for corporate control (ivloerland  1995), 
A fourth possibility is the limitation of voting rights per shareholder in the company by-laws,  A 
takeover  can  only  be  successful  by  a coalition  of shareholders  if an  investor  wants  to  gain 
control of the  m,~ority' of votes (e,g, Alcatel-Alsthom), 
All  four  factors which have been  discLlssed  as  possible explanations  for  the limited  "need"  for 
using  non-voting shares  suggest  that  o\vners  of corporations  have  alternatives  to  non-voting 
shares  \vhich  they  can  usc  in  order  to  keep  control.  And  they  seem  to  make  use  of these 
opportunities to a large extent. 
7.2  The voting right premium in different corporate governance-systems 
In order to provide an assessment of the absolute level of the voting right  premium of over 50 
percent  in  France,  this  section  offers  a  comparison  of results  for  France  with  comparable 
results from other countries, 
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Figure 6:  Voting right premiums in  different cOllntries18 
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As Figure 6 shows, the highest  voting right premium can  be found  in Italy,  with France being 
second. Among the major countries for which this has so far been investigated, the voting right 
premium is  lowest in  Norway  and  Canada.  The  method  used  for calculating the voting right 
premium  in the studies whose  results  are  summarized  in  Figure  6,  are largely  the same.  The 
sizable  difference  of the  results  for  the  individual  countries  are  remarkable.  Still  more 
surprising is the fact that in each country the national average price differences between voting 
and non-voting shares appear to be largely constant for considerable time spans  if there are  no 
changes  in  legislation.  This  suggests  that  there  should  be  country-related  factors  which 
determine the size of the voting right  premium or,  in other words, the value of private control 
rights. 
It  can  be  assumed  that  different  corporate  governance  systems  lead  to  different  potential 
benefits for those who  are  in  control.  Thus  following  Zingales  (1994),  the value  of private 
control rights  measured  by  the average  voting  premium  can  be interpreted as  a quantitative 
measurement of the "quality" of a corporate governance system. France is  characterized by  an 
insider  control  system  in  the  classification  of FrankslMayer  (1995).  In  an  insider  control 
system, the possible private benefits of control can be assumed to be  larger than  in  a outsider 
control system. 
Following this  idea,  an attempt is  made to explain the different  voting rights premia in the  ten 
countries, which  are  covered in  Figure 6,  as a consequence of the  "quality" of the respective 
national  corporate  control  systems.  In  order  to  provide  the  "quality"  of  the  corporate 
governance systems,  three different  characteristics of these systems  are "rated":  the quality  of 
18  For  f'J!!l..'ld.l!  (sample  period  I  9R \-1990)  RobinsomRumsey/White  (1995),  for  Germany  (1980-1997) 
.\/lIus-'1'vrell (1999). for  Great Britain (1955-1982) ,\/eggil1son (1990), for  Israel  (1974-1980)  Levy (1983),  for -28-
national  accounting  standards,  the  strength  of shareholder  rights,  and  the  possibility  of 
enforcing these shareholder rights. 
It can  be  assumed  that  im·cstors  base  their  investment  decisions  on  the  publicly  available 
infonnation about  11  company including the annual reports.  Different accounting standards may 
result  ill  different  depreciation figures  and  different  levels  of profits. Non-voting shareholders 
may  be  at  a  disadvantage  in  a  country  with  deficient  accounting  standards  since  the 
management which is oHm related to the voting shareholders can achieve "private benefits" for 
example by  high  salaries and  non-monetary benefits which cannot be recognized by looking at 
the annual  reports. 
The rating \\ith respect to aCl..:llunting standards is based on the work of La Porta et a!. (1998a, 
Table 7).  It is based 011  an assessment oCsevcn categories of  balance sheet items which leads to 
the variable rUlil/g. The numerical values for the quality of the accounting systems of  individual 
countries  arc providcd  in  Appendix  11.  They  range  from  62 for  Italy  and Germany to  83  for 
Swedcn,  with  higher  values  indicating  better  accounting  systems  from  a  shareholder 
perspccti\·e.  TIlt! \·aluc tt)!"  France is  69. 
'-"''''.'----'  .•...... '-''--~---------------------, 
HYPOtlH'sis  (,  TIll.'  l·lluntry,sl't'cifk  rating  of the accounting standard  influences  the level of 
the voting right  prL·miul11.  A higher rating leads to a lower premium. 
The slope uf the n  .. ·grcssiol1 lillc sho\\'n in Figure 7 is consistent with the hypothesis. 
Figure 7:  YRP. rating on accounting stHudards and law enforcement 
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---,  ..... ,  .  ......  . ......  _-.. _  .......  _..  l  (  (( 7  Ode  aard  (1998).  for  Sweden  (1983-1990) 
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outside shareholders, the more important it  is  for  them that they  can  at least  use  their voting 
rights  at  the  annual  general  meeting  to  exercise  some  control  over  the  management. 
Conversely, the better the legal  system protects shareholders, the less they need the protection 
which the voting right affords them. This leads to Hypothesis 7: 
Hypothesis 7:  The strength of the legal  rights of shareholders influences the voting premium. 
Countries with extensive rights have a smaller premium than countries with very limited rights. 
This Hypothesis  is  tested by  fitting  a regression  with  rights as the independent variable.  The 
variable rights is  a quantitative measure of the strength of shareholders· rights.  Based  on the 
work of La Porta et al.  (1998a, Table 2),  numerical values of rights are calculated  as the sum 
of five  characteristics  of national  legal  systems.  Details  are  summarized  in  Appendix  11. 
Although  these  characteristics  do  not  refer  specifically  to  non-voting  shares,  it  appears 
permissible to assume that general indictors of  the strength of  shareholders· rights carry over to 
the situation of non-voting shareholders. For France the value for  the  variable rights is  2 on  a 
scale from  0 to  5 with  higher values indicating better legal  status.  This  value  is low compared 
to those for  the  US  and  Canada.  The  difference  reflects,  among  other things, the  fact  that in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries the decision of the management should be based on the shareholder 
interest which is not the case for France (e.g. Bissara 1998). 
The enforcement of shareholder rights  can  be of equal  relevance as the rights themselves. The 
efficiency of the judical system and  level of corruption are of  importance in  this context. Non-
voting shareholders can try to prevent a disadvantage by appealing to court, and they might be 
more inclined  to  buy  non-voting shares if they  could  count  on  the legal system  if a relevant 
connict comes up. Hypothesis 8 is based on this idea: 
Hypothesis  8:  The enforcement  of shareholder  rights  influence  the  voting  premium.  Better 
enforcement possibilities lead to a lower premium. 
In the regression to test this hypothesis, an  index enforce for the enforceability of shareholders· 
rights is used.  It  is calculated as the sum of five  criteria which are also  derived from the work 
of La  Porta et  al.  (see  Appendix  12).  A higher  score  indicates  better or easier  enforcement. 
France receives  44,87  out  of 50  index  points  which  is  mainly  due  to the  inefficiency  of the 
judical  system.  As  the  right  panel  in  Figure  7  shows,  the  results  of the  simple  regression 
support the hypothesis. -30-
Table  11  reports the results of the single regressions relating the  voting  premium  in the  nine 
countries  to  the  values  for  the  three  explanatory  variables  accounting  standards,  legal 
protection an enforceability. The signs of  the coefticients are as expected under the hypotheses. 
Table 11: Single regression results of the international comparison 
VRPcoullt  = a + hy )othcsiswuntx  * - 10% significance level 
hlilothesis on  conshtnt  yariable  Rl  significance Icycl 
(t-value)  (t-valuc} 
rating  199,516  -2,440  0,469  0,029 
(3,O72)*'  (  -2,6(0)* 
rights  52.204  -9,877  0,400  0,050 
(.J.,IH8)*  (-2.310)* 
enforce  27()'(}()o  -5,399  0,722  0,002 
(5,04! )*  (-4,554 )* 
All three regressions have relatively high results for R 
2 and are significant at the 5% level.  This 
suggests that it  is  appropriate to interpret the voting premium as a measure of the"  quality" of 
the legal system - and possibly also of the corporate governance system of  a country. 
Since  the  last  three  factors  together  influence  the  investment  decisions  of  potential 
shareholders, a stepwise regression  is  used  to  analyze the joint impact of  the  variables on the 
voting premium.  Table  12  summarizes  the  result.  It seems that the voting premium is  mainly 
detem1ined by the quality of the legal system,  composed of two factors,  namely the  strength of 
shareholder rights and the enforceability of theses rights, whereas the variable rating could not 
improve the significance of the regression. 
Table 12: Stepwise regression for nn internationnl comparison 
!  VRPcounto = a + hXl +  ... + hXn 
constant  rights 
(t-value)  (t-value) 
2f>O,! 08  ·(',882 
(7 .. .00)*  (-J,607)* 
enforce 
(t-value) 
·4,667 
( ·(d)  10) * 
The result is robust to autocorrelation and 1l1ulticolinearity. 
* - 10% significance Icyel 
adj.  RZ  significance level  N 
0,875  0,001  10 
However, taken together, the single and multiple regression results underline the  influence of 
the  variables  accounting  standards,  shareholder  rights  as  well  as  the  enforcement  of the 
shareholder rights  on  the premium  in  different  countries with  different  corporate  governance 
systems. 
La  Porta  et  a1.  (1998a)  found  that  in  countries  with  French  legal  tradition
19
,  accounting 
standards and  investor rights  are less  developed.  As  they  point  out  lithe  most widely  ::,pread 
legal jamily,  Ihal originating ill  the  French  civil lmv,  appears  to have the  worst efficiency 
19  La  Porta et  al.  (1998a) analyzed  49  countries  and deyeloped  four  categories  for  legal  traditions:  English. 
French, German and Scandinavian origin. -31-
properties from the perspective of  COlporate  govemGnce." A possible effect of  this  can  be a 
difficult access to capital markets or no  access at all.  This  is consistent with the  finding  in this 
study that  in  France non-voting capital  can  only be  issued  with  a high discount  which  makes 
equity  finance  via  non-voting  shares  very  expensive.  On  the  other  hand,  French  companies 
have different alternatives to  non-voting  capital.  Therefore it  might  go too far  to interpret  the 
empirical  results of this  study  as  evidence that French companies have a disadvantage  because 
of their nlUity corporate governance-system.  In addition,  it might be too  simplistic to postulate 
a straightfor'rvard  correspondence  between  the  three  indicators  of what  constitutes  a good 
legal system  from  the perspective of  shareholders on the one hand  and the "qualityll  of  a given 
country's corporate governance system,  as the quote fi'om La Porta et aI.  suggests. We do  not 
yet know well  enough what  constitutes an overall good  corporate governance system to draw 
such a sweeping conclusion. 
8  Conclusion 
This  paper analyzed  the  voting  right  premium  in  France as  the  additional  price the investor 
would  have  to pay  over the  price of a non-voting share  in order to have a voting share.  With 
51,35 percent, the average voting premium  is surprisingly high in France.  The voting premium 
varies  over  time  and  between  companies.  The  only  explanation  for  different  premiums  of 
different  companies  can  be  found  in  their  specific  shareholder structure.  In  an  international 
comparison, the level of the average voting premium in a country is found to  vary significantly 
and, as  it seems, as a consequence of different accounting standards, shareholder rights and the 
enforcement of these rights. 
A high  voting  premium  makes  equity  finance  more  expensive  in  France.  Non-voting  shares 
have never been  of great importance for financing.  The number of companies  with  non-voting 
shares has decreased since  1987 and this tendency will go on  in the future.  it appears likely that 
the voting right  premium  will  be influenced  by changes in the corporate governance system. If 
there  were  indeed  a tendency  towards  a convergence  of the different  corporate  governance 
systems due to international pressure
20
.  The Vienot report (1995)  recommended changes with 
regard  to  transparency  and  was  critical  with  reciprocal  directorships.  If these  suggestions 
would be adopted the voting premium might decrease  in France.  The low level of Canada and 
the  US  will  not  be  reached  since  this  would  presume  a considerable  change  in  the  French 
~II  Shlcifcr/Vishny  (11)97)  and  Fanta  (1997)  are  among  those. who  see. a  tendency  ,?f  a  convergence.  Bcbchuk/Roc (1999) and  Schmidt/Spindler (1999) do  not share  tlus  assumpl10ns  and p~o\ilde arg~ments \vby  convergence is not likcly to come about soon.  For a theoretical approach of complementarIty of certam elements 
in financial  systcms sec Hackelhalffyrell (1998). -32-
corporate governance  system  which  is  unlikely  to happen.  Only  miner  changes in  the  system 
wiJlmost likely appear (e,g, with regard to shareholder information and transparency). 
Press  reports have  often speculated that  the integration process  within  the  ED will lead  to  a 
prohibition of non-voting shares which I question. The ED  commission  proposes a one share -
one vote - system in  the third  modification
21  as of November 20,  1991  (art.  33, subsection 1). 
The member cOllntries  are given expressively the right to allow non-voting shares.  Non-voting 
capital  should  not  exceed  50%  of total  equity,  but  the  non-voting  shareholders  should  be 
granted a higher dividend than to ordinary shareholders. The modification proposes a revival of 
the voting right for non-voting shares in the case of non-payment of  the dividend. 
d'fi  . tion as of Seplember 9,  1983,  second modification as 
~1  First proposition as of December  13,  1972. first  1110  I Ica 
"r  nN'f'fTlhN I(L  1990. -33-
9  Appendix 
Appendix 1:  Companies and their voting right premium in the sample 
company  non-voting  from  to  observations  avel'age 
shar'c  VRP 
BNP  C[  18.10.1993  02.12.1994  281  15,02% 
Buuygucs  C[  20.02.1987  31.12.l996  2.099  46,96% 
Casino-GlI ichard  ADP  2-l.06.1986  31.12.1996  2.623  36,78% 
CSEE  ADP  2-l.(16.1986  09.12.1994  1.688  58,04% 
Delmas-Vicljl~ux  Cl  02.08.1988  01.02.1993  562  85,05% 
Elf-Aquitainc  CP  2-l.(l6.1986  31.12.1996  2.619  22,98% 
Eridallia Bcghin-Sll)'  CI  22.10.1986  31.12.1995  2.150  27,38% 
Essi\(u'  ADP  2·U)6.1986  31.12.1996  2.620  69,79% 
Groupe Victoirc  C1  03.01.1989  06.1O.l993  319  81,41% 
Legrand  ADP  2-l.06.1986  31.12.1996  2.617  56,79% 
Luu .... r·c  CI  12.08.1986  31.12.l996  2.092  93,20% 
l\1ors  ADP  13.09.1988  24.07.1990  349  2,06% 
OGF  CI  o  l,(19. 1988  05.08.1996  515  18,03% 
Oreal L'  CI  22.(l9.1986  30.12.l994  1.827  92,69% 
Pcchclbronn  CI  16.02.1987  22.07.1991  966  87,39% 
Pechinc)'  CIP  18.12.1995  31.12.1996  259  -6,10% 
PiIH.'r-Hcidsicck  CI  10.12.1986  06.09.1996  630  55,41% 
Pl'omoucs  CI  30.03.1987  31.12.1996  1.819  70,57% 
Rhonc-Poulenc  CIP  26.01.1993  05.05.l995  562  -6,34% 
Rllbcrtct  CI  OH1I.I989  31.12.1996  1.858  71,83% 
Roussel-Uclaf  ADP  2Hl6.1986  31.12.l996  2.283  76,94% 
Sagcm  ADP  24.06.1986  31.12.1996  2.460  107,00% 
St. Fiacre  CI  13.06.1989  14.06.1996  399  0,44% 
Taittinger  CI  14.08.1986  31.12.l996  2.136  89,15% 
Total  CP  24.06.1986  31.12.1996  2.626  31,24% -34-
Appendix 2: Sample companies with CDV 
company  from  to  obsen'utions  QCDVgesamt 
Bouygucs  10.08.1993  31.12.1996  485  96,00% 
Eridania Bcghin-Say  03.10.1988  31.12.1996  1.224  99,03% 
Groupc Victoirc  03.01.1989  06.10.1993  692  101,43% 
OGF  09.01.1989  28.09.1995  228  94,87% 
Oreal L'  18.0~.1989  30. 12.1994  1.226  99,20% 
PcchcJbrolln  03.10.1988  22.07.1991  456  96,98% 
Pipcr-Hcil.lsicc\,;  17.10.1988  06.09.1996  214  97,39% 
Robcrtct  04.01.1989  31.12.1996  212  96,47% 
St. Fiacrc  13.06.1989  28.05.1996  28  120,76% 
Appendix 3: Shareholder strllctUl'e during the sample period 1986 - 1996 
type  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
N  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  3  4  3  3 
S  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  1  0  0  0 
G  5  G  10  II  II  10  9  9  7  G  3 
M  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
F  ~  5  5  G  6  6  6  6  6  5  5 
1:  \3  16  20  22  22  21  20  22  20  17  14 
N  group  1:  no  major shareholder,  many small investors,  often after  privatization  with  "noyeau  dur"  (core 
shareholders) 
S  group 2:  state company with direct and indirect control of morc than 50% of the voting right by the state 
G  group 3: company belongs to a group which controls more than 50% of the voting rights 
M  group ·k  110  majority shareholder. but  control  of the  company through a family  acting in  concert  with 
friends and olher companies 
F  group 5: family/employee conlrol of more than 50% of the voting rights held directly and indirectly 
Appendix 4: Statuary first dividend for voting and ADP-shares after tax 
Ii  rst dhidcnl.l of the voting  first dividend of the ADP  first dividend of the ADP 
c()mpan~'  shar"c bascd on  thc par "aluc  share based on the Ilar mJue  share as u product with VS 
Casino  5,00%  7,50% 
CSEE  5,00%  12,50% 
Dart}1  7,50%  35,00% 
Essilor  6,00%  10,00% 
Lcgl"and  7,50%  I,G;  min.  18,75 FRF 
Mors  5,tH)%  1.5;  min.  3,33FRF 
Rousscl-Uclaf  10.00%  15,00% 
Sagcm  5,00%  15,00% 
I  _ Darty is not  a sample company -35-
Appendix 5:  VRP~"DT and standard deviation cr  for the sample companies 
company  1986  1981  1988  1989  1990  1991 
VRP  cr  VRP  cr  VRP  cr  VRP  cr  VRP  0"  VRP  cr 
BNP 
Bouygues  0,4666  0,2309  0,3936  0,2001  0,8741  0,2735  0,5016  0,2623  0,4475  0,1095 
Casino-Guichard  0,3015  0,0742  0,2283  0,0608  0,2879  0,1053  0,5254  0,0828  0,2829  0,0886  0,4865  0,0922 
CSEE  0,1797  0,0641  0,1914  0,1008  0,3473  0,1349  0,6719  0,4301  1,2820  0,1549  0,6220  0,1262 
Delmas-Vieljeux  0,6254  0,1866  1,3618  0,2758  0.7291  0,1911  0,6667  0,2731 
Elf-Aquitaine  0,0454  0,0244  0,1031  0,0435  0,1632  0,0441  0,2248  0,0436  0,3595  0,0520  0,4955  0,1086 
Eridania 8eghin-Say  0,3790  0,1084  0,3808  0,1300  0,2762  0,1110  0,5066  0,0962  0,3643  0,1334  0,2249  0,0889 
Essilor  0,4003  0,0657  0,3632  0,0920  0,6142  0,1687  1,0832  0,1006  0,9814  0,1983  0,9715  0,1160 
Groupe Victoire  1,0220  0,0982  0,7674  0,5127  1,0112  0,3834 
Legrand  0,2099  0,0815  0,1648  0,0841  0,2742  0,0639  0,6548  0,2041  0,8610  0,1239  0,9412  0,1182 
Louvre  0,3198  0,0668  0,5402  0,1351  0,5567  0,2574  1,0801  0,1456  1,3022  0,1878  1,1509  0,1727 
Mors  0,0103  0,0491  0,0394  0,0522  -0,0069  0,0810 
OGF  0,0505  0,0438  0,0621  0,0839  0,1900  0,0711  0,3612  0,0818 
Oreal L'  0,2983  0,0730  0,6507  0,2486  0,7919  0,2707  1,1819  0,1700  1,3541  0,1316  1,1731  0,1231 
Pechelbronn  0,5541  0,1269  0,5132  0,2042  0,9332  0,2058  1,3784  0,2689  1,1254  0,3608 
Pechiney 
Piper-Heidsieck  0,6611  0,1875  0,6680  0,1317  0,7635  0,2017  0,4947  0,1031  0,3388  0,0733  0,1992  0,1054 
Promodes  0,5192  0,1885  0,4897  0,2175  1,2351  0,2704  1,1134  0,3398  1,0002  0,2245 
Rh6ne-Poulenc 
Robertet  0,9549  0,2269  1,0777  0,2814  0,8810  0,1571 
Roussel-Uclaf  0,5246  0,1890  0,4232  0,1216  0,7143  0,1652  0,8722  0,1207  1,1560  0,1692  1,1957  0,1486 
Sagem  0,4161  0,0995  0,3404  0,1588  0,9642  0,1692  1,3097  0,1385  1,4733  0,1498  1,4957  0,1401 
St. Fiacre  0,1821  0,0202  0,2025  0,0800  0,0445  0,2420 
Taittinger  0,4216  0,1046  0,5502  0,2073  0,7801  0,2639  1,2278  0,1698  1,1067  0,2310  1,1058  0,2012 
Total  0,0970  0,0283  0,1368  0,0486  0,1575  0,0484  0,2203  0,0695  0,4353  0,0764  0,4897  0,0828 company  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  total 
VRP  0- VRP  0- VRP  0- VRP  0- VRP  0- VRP  0- T-Test 
BNP  0,0621  0,0463  0,1707  0,0723  0,1502  0,0803  31,35*** 
Bouygues  0,6012  0,1556  0,5258  0,1729  0,2055  0,0557  0,2255  0,0443  0,1716  0,0708  0,4696  0,2687  80,06*** 
Casino-Guichard  0,5851  0,0836  0,3701  0,1015  0,2744  0,0579  0,2556  0,0755  0,4169  0,0898  0,3678  0,1446  130,23*** 
CSEE  0,6628  0,2783  0,7473  0,3932  0,1636  0,1027  0,5804  0,4223  56,47*** 
Delmas-Vieljeux  0,3143  0,3555  0,3000  0,1384  0,8505  0,4107  49,09*** 
Elf-Aquitaine  0,4513  0,0536  0,2380  0,1173  0,1567  0,0366  0,0978  0,0238  0,1027  0,0169  0,2298  0,1543  76,19*** 
Eridania Beghin-Say  0,2906  0,0573  0,2325  0,0558  0,1348  0,0546  0,0417  0,0487  0,2738  0,1527  83,11*** 
Essilor  1,1172  0,0996  0,8069  0,2350  0,4354  0,0740  0,4084  0,0664  0,3490  0,0832  0,6979  0,3220  110,94*** 
Groupe Victoire  0,5484  0,2860  0,4773  0,1138  0,8141  0,3782  38,44*** 
Legrand  0,8262  0,0968  0,6378  0,2041  0,4292  0,0830  0,5398  0,0601  0,5271  0,0638  0,5679  0,2714  107,04*** 
Louvre  1,3159  0,2020  1,2589  0,3035  0,7850  0,1516  0,8917  0,1119  0,8164  0,1301  0,9320  0,3532  120,68*** 
Mors  0,0206  0,0668  5,76*** 
OGF  0,1896  0,1309  0,2434  0,0770  0,1962  0,0549  0,1760  0,0541  0,1538  0,0615  0,1803  0,1245  32,85*** 
Oreal L'  1,1135  0,1171  0,6562  0,2797  0,2859  0,0877  0,9269  0,3727  106,30*** 
Pechelbronn  0,8739  0,4041  67,20*** 
Pechiney  -0,0906  0,0311  -0,0600  0,0322  -0,0610  0,0321  -30,57*** 
Piper-Heidsieck  0,2112  0,0839  0,5539  0,1310  0,3325  0,1746  0,2979  0,2687  0,0488  0,0826  0,5541  0,2598  53,54*** 
Promodes  0,8122  0,2084  0,4364  0,1793  0,3684  0,1463  0,3361  0,0624  0,4924  0,1015  0,7057  0,3796  79,29*** 
Rhone-Poulenc  -0,0012  0,0631  -0,1338  0,0664  -0,0351  0,0380  -0,0634  0,0632  -23,77*** 
Robertet  0,7202  0,2059  0,4341  0,1194  0,6561  0,1181  0,4927  0,0680  0,5802  0,1943  0,7183  0,2747  112,70*** 
Roussel-Uclaf  1,0930  0,1433  0,7502  0,1855  0,5462  0,1111  0,5090  0,1154  0,3187  0,1453  0,7694  0,3263  112,65*** 
Sagem  1,4185  0,1425  1,1281  0,2717  0,7683  0,1127  1,0510  0,1874  1,1587  0,1251  1,0700  0,3887  136,54*** 
St. Fiacre  -0,5144  0,1832  -0,5511  0,1361  -0,2499  0,1547  0,2011  0,3501  0,3482  0,1175  0,0044  0,3325  0,26 
Taittinger  1,1392  0,1535  1,0707  0,1290  0,9075  0,1733  0,5696  0,1539  0,4442  0,1060  0,8915  0,3271  125,96*** 
Total  0,4954  0,1125  0,3770  0,1232  0,2982  0,0554  0,3016  0,0635  0,3268  0,0519  0,3124  0,1473  108,64*** 
Ho  VRP =0 
H1  VRP +=  0 
***  0,01 % significance level of VRP :;t:O -37-
Appendix 6:  Voting premium for diffel'ent shareholder structures 
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Appendix 7:  VJl)ue of COV for L'Oreal and Robertet 
L'OreatCOV 
RobertetCDV 
Appendix 8:  Casino and Promodes quotes for both share classes 
380 
3fjO 
;J.40 
320 
JOO 
Ceslno 
Promodes 
I>  total 
7'%l 
i5' 
voting  sha.re. 
CI -38-
Appendix 9: Events during the takeover contest Casino/Rallye and Promodes 
datc 
August 
Septcmber 1 
September 2 
September 2-g 
September  12 
September  12-30 
September  14 
Septcmber 25 
September 26 
October -l 
October 25 
October 21} 
October - November 
December 2  <J 
event 
Rumors of a forthcoming takcover offer to buy Casino. 
Conditionallakcovcr offcr of Promodes to buy Casino. 
Casino classified offer as unfriendly. 
Suspcnsion of trading of Casino  sh~res. 
Successors of founder decide not to sell and to support Rallye. 
Suspcnsion of trading of Casino shares. 
Ullconditional counter offcr by Rallye (not accepted by COB). 
Improved offer by Proll1odcs. 
New counter ofTer by Rallye (accepted by COB). 
Successors of founder cannot decide which offer to support. 
Rlillyc can make use of double voting rights. 
Rallyc announces decision to use BSA to increase voting rights. 
Promodcs tries to achieve a court decision that Rallye cannot use  BSA  to increase its 
voting rights / investors can sell their shares to Rallye or Promodes. 
Agreement  between  Casino/Rallye  and  Promodes  to  finish  the  takeover  contest; 
Promodcs withdraw its  takeover offer. 
Appendix  10:  Development  of non-voting  shares CI  as  a  percentage  of total  equity 
capital 
compan)'  introduc- January  September  December  December  December 
tion  1988  1988  1990  1992  1994 
Bou.n~ucs  14,29%  10,84%  6,13%  1,64%  0,86%  0,56% 
Eridania  25,00%  22,·0%  13,09%  3,37%  1,58% 
Groupe Victoirc  16,67(Yo  16,67%  12,50%  0,16%  0,08% 
O.G,F.  11.11%  11,l0%  11,10%  7,21%  6,66%  2,06% 
Oreal  <J,09%  8,75%  6,70%  5,42%  5,18% 
PcchclbrOl11l  1  (J/J7%  16,60%  8,43%  1,92% 
Pipcr-Hcidsieck  2.),00%  23,41%  19,62%  0,53%  0,18%  0,17% 
Robcrtct  \(i.67%  16,67%  16,67%  7,89%  7,19%  7,19% 
sources:  £OIUIl)!1  2::1:  LOll1bardlBellonILaforgc (1988) 
col!!!!.~'\.:1: own calculations -39-
Appendix 11:  HJ\ting of accounting standards and shareholder rights in  comparison 
C()UJ1tr~  VRP  rating  l"ights 
Canada 
France 
German), 
Great Britain 
Israel 
Italy 
Nonnl}, 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
lJSA 
!U4% 
51,35(10 
2X,15% 
IJ,30% 
45,50% 
X  1.50% 
5,40% 
12,00% 
18,lG% 
IOA7% 
74 
69 
62 
78 
64 
62 
74 
83 
68 
71 
4 
2 
4 
3 
o 
3 
2 
5 
source:  La  Porta et al.  (I ()()l'Ia),  Appendix Table 2 and 7 
rating ,;  10; I)()] 
Rights I: 10;5) 
rating of accounting standards improves with  higher values:  Index created by  examining and 
rating companies'  1990  anllual  reports  011  their inclusion or omission of 90  items.  These fall 
into  7  categories  (general  information,  income  statements,  balance  sheets,  funds  flow 
statement. accounting standards, stock data and special items).  A minimum of 3 companies in 
e~H.:h coulllry \\ere studied. The companies represent a cross-section of "arious industry groups 
where  industrial  companies  numbered  70%  while  financial  companies  represented  the 
remaining ]0%. 
shareholder rights  impro\'e  with  higher values:  An  index  aggregating  the shareholder rights 
which La Porta et al. (1998a) labeled as "anti-director rights." The index  is formed by adding  1 
when:  (I) the  country  allows shareholders  to  mail  their proxy  vote;  (2)  shareholders  are not 
required  to  deposit  their shares  prior  to  the  General  Shareholders'  Meeting;  (3)  cumulative 
\'oting  is  allowed;  (4)  an  oppressed  minorities  mechanism  is  in place;  or  (5)  when  the 
minimum percentage of share capital  that entitles a shareholder  to call  for an  Extraordinary 
Shareholders' Meeting is less than or equal to  10% (the sample median). 
Appendix 12:  Enforcement of shareholder rights in comparison 
country  A  B  C  D  E 
Canada  9,25  10,00  10,00  9,67  8,96 
France  8,00  8,98  9,05  9,65  9,19 
German}  9,00  9,23  8,93  9,90  9,77 
Great Britain  10,00  8,57  9,10  9,71  9,63 
Israel  I  (l,OO  4,82  8,33  8,25  7,54 
Itall  6,75  8,33  6,13  9,35  9,17 
Nonyay  10,00  10,00  10,00  9,88  9,71 
Sweden  10,00  10,00  10,00  9,40  9,58 
Switzerland  10,00  10,00  10,00  9,98  9,98 
lJSA  10,00  10,00  8.63  9,98  9.00 
SOLlrce:  La Porta ct al.  (I 99Xa),  Appendix Table 7 
A .. [!l;10} 
B (;  [OJ IO) 
C f; [0; HI) 
D I; IOj 10) 
E I; [O;IOI 
enforce I: [Oj50) 
Efficiency of judi cal system (increases with higher values) 
Rule of Law (increases with higher values) 
Corruption (decreases with higher values) 
Risk of Expropriation (decreases with higher values) 
Risk of Contract Repudiation (decreases with higher values) 
enforcement of shareholdcr rights (increases with higher values) 
efif()rce=A+B+C+D+E 
enforce 
47,88 
44,87 
46,83 
47,01 
38,94 
39,73 
49,59 
48,98 
49.96 
47,71 -40-
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